University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Technical Reports (CIS)

Department of Computer & Information Science

January 2008

Unified Platform for Secure Networked Information Systems
Wenchao Zhou
University of Pennsylvania

Yun Mao
University of Pennsylvania

Boon Thau Loo
University of Pennsylvania, boonloo@cis.upenn.edu

Martín Abadi
University of California Santa Cruz, Microsoft Research

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports

Recommended Citation
Wenchao Zhou, Yun Mao, Boon Thau Loo, and Martín Abadi, "Unified Platform for Secure Networked
Information Systems", . January 2008.

University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-CIS-08-05
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/872
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Unified Platform for Secure Networked Information Systems
Abstract
In this paper, we present a unified declarative platform for specifying, implementing, analyzing and
auditing large-scale secure information systems. Our proposed system builds upon techniques from
logic-based trust management systems, declarative networking, and data analysis via provenance. First,
we propose the Secure Network Datalog (SeNDlog) language that unifies Binder, a logic-based language
for access control in distributed systems, and Network Datalog (NDlog), a distributed recursive query
language for declarative networks. SeNDlog enables network routing, information systems, and their
security policies to be specified and implemented within a common declarative framework. Second, we
extend existing distributed recursive query processing techniques to execute SeNDlog programs that
incorporate the notion of authenticated communication among untrusted nodes. Third, we demonstrate
that an integrated declarative framework enables cross-layer analysis and auditing via the use of
distributed network provenance. Finally, using a local cluster and the PlanetLab testbed, we perform a
detailed performance study of a variety of declarative secure networked information systems
implemented using our platform. We further perform an evaluation of network provenance via a SeNDlogbased packet tracing service within a local cluster.

Comments
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MSCIS-08-05

This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/872

Unified Platform for Secure Networked
Information Systems
Wenchao Zhou∗
∗

Yun Mao∗

Boon Thau Loo∗
†

University of Pennsylvania
UC Santa Cruz
Microsoft Research
{wenchaoz, maoy, boonloo}@cis.upenn.edu, abadi@microsoft.com

ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a unified declarative platform for specifying, implementing, analyzing and auditing large-scale secure information systems. Our proposed system builds upon techniques from
logic-based trust management systems, declarative networking, and
data analysis via provenance. First, we propose the Secure Network
Datalog (SeNDlog) language that unifies Binder, a logic-based language for access control in distributed systems, and Network Datalog (NDlog), a distributed recursive query language for declarative
networks. SeNDlog enables network routing, information systems,
and their security policies to be specified and implemented within
a common declarative framework. Second, we extend existing distributed recursive query processing techniques to execute SeNDlog
programs that incorporate the notion of authenticated communication among untrusted nodes. Third, we demonstrate that an integrated declarative framework enables cross-layer analysis and auditing via the use of distributed network provenance. Finally, using
a local cluster and the PlanetLab testbed, we perform a detailed
performance study of a variety of declarative secure networked information systems implemented using our platform. We further
perform an evaluation of network provenance via a SeNDlog-based
packet tracing service within a local cluster.

1.

Martı́n Abadi†‡

‡

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation of networked
information systems deployed at Internet-scale for a variety of application domains ranging from Internet monitoring infrastructures,
publish-subscribe systems, to content distribution networks. Despite their widespread usage, designing and implementing these
large-scale systems remains a challenge, in part because of the
sheer scale of deployment, but also due to emerging security threats.
In response, there have been several proposals aimed at evolving
the underlying network infrastructure to provide better support for
accountability [6, 19], efficient packet tracing [30] and flow analysis [33], all are geared towards better tools for analyzing and securing networks. Surprisingly few of these proposals have been
integrated in a useful manner in existing networked information
systems, or have any significant impact on the design of new dis-
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tributed query engines. We argue that the reasons are two-fold.
First, these mechanisms are typically designed to tackle specific
security threats at the underlying network, without taking into account content distribution and information processing at higher layers. Second, they are often afterthought, implemented and enforced
in a different language or environment from the networks that they
are trying to protect, hence raising the barrier for adoption.
As a step towards the integration of networked information systems with security policies, we present a unified declarative platform for specifying, implementing, analyzing and auditing largescale secure information systems. Our work has largely been inspired by recent efforts at using declarative languages that are aimed
at simplifying the process of specifying and implementing security
policies and networks. Our paper builds upon and unifies three
bodies of work: (1) logic-based trust management systems [32,
15, 20, 26, 11], (2) declarative networking [23, 22, 21], and (3)
database techniques for analyzing data computations via the concept of provenance (or lineage [8]). From a practical standpoint,
this integration has several benefits, ranging from ease of management, one fewer language to learn, one fewer set of optimizations,
finer-grain control over the interaction between security and network protocols, and the potential of doing analysis, optimizations,
and auditing across levels.
Access control is central to security and it is pervasive in computer system. Over the years, logical ideas and tools have been used
to explain and improve access control. Several logic-based languages such as Binder [11], SD3 [15], D1LP [20] and SecPAL [26]
have been proposed to ease the process of expressing, analyzing
and encoding access control policies. Similarly, the Network Datalog (NDlog) declarative networking language also has its roots in
logic programming. NDlog is a distributed variant of Datalog to express recursive queries [29] over network graphs , hence allowing
compact, clear formulations of a variety of routing protocols and
overlay networks which themselves exhibit recursive properties.
Despite being developed by two different communities and used
for different purposes, logic-based access control languages and
NDlog extend Datalog in surprisingly similar ways: by supporting
the notion of context (location) to identify components (nodes) in
distributed systems. This suggests the possibility of unifying these
languages to create an integrated system, exploiting good language
features, execution engine, and optimizations. In addition, our unification will dispense with much of the special machinery proposed
for access control, and instead rely on distributed database engines
to process these policies, leveraging well-studied query processing
and optimization techniques. It has been shown previously [1] that
access control languages such as Binder share similarities to data
integration languages such as that used in the Tsimmis [9] data integration system, further indicating that ideas and methods from

the database community are directly applicable. Specifically, the
contributions of this paper are as follows:
Unified declarative language for secure networked information
systems: We propose the Secure Network Datalog (SeNDlog) language that unifies logic-based access control and declarative networking languages. Our language builds upon our previous proposal [3] by incorporating runtime types for location specifiers which
references data based on both IP addresses and logical overlay addresses. It provides support for dynamically layering multiple overlays at runtime, and enables security policies to be enforced across
various layers. We further demonstrate that SeNDlog can be used to
declaratively specify a variety of networked systems, including authenticated path-vector routing protocol, secure Chord distributed
hash table [25], and a secure implementation of the PIER [14] distributed query processor, several of which can be layered on top of
each other.
Authenticated distributed query processing: We extend existing distributed recursive query processing [21] techniques to execute SeNDlog queries, by incorporating the notion of authenticated communication. Our proposed authenticated pipelined seminaı̈ve (APSN) evaluation ensures that all communication among
untrusted nodes is authenticated during query execution, and recursive queries are evaluated in a pipelined fashion suitable for asynchronous distributed settings. The generated distributed dataflows
further supports runtime address types which can be used to support
layered authentication at various layers. When implemented, these
dataflows implement the distributed information system together
with their security policies. Beyond our platform, these techniques
are applicable to other distributed stream processing systems [10]
that require access control and enforcement of security policies.
Diagnostics and forensics with network provenance: The dataflow
framework used in declarative networks captures information flow
as distributed streams computations. Hence, it is natural to utilize
data provenance [8] to “explain” the existence of any network state.
We classify data provenance into various types (e.g. local vs distributed, online vs offline, authenticated, etc.), and demonstrate that
they map into various use cases for secure networks including realtime diagnostics, forensics, accountability, and trust management.
Implementation and PlanetLab experimentation: We have developed a secure declarative networking engine that supports unified platform via the SeNDlog language, authenticated distributed
query processing capabilities, as well as basic support for constructing and querying network provenance. Using a local cluster as well as PlanetLab [27], we demonstrate the viability of our
system via a detailed performance study on a variety of secure networked information systems. We further perform an evaluation of
network provenance via a SeNDlog-based packet tracing service
within a local cluster.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first present
a background overview of trust management and declarative networking languages, focusing on the Binder [11] and NDlog [21].
In Section 3, we present the unified SeNDlog language, and present
several examples in Section 4 that illustrate usage of the language.
In Section 5, we demonstrate how SeNDlog queries are compiled
into authenticated dataflows to implement a variety of secure information systems. Section 6 outlines analysis opportunities that are
enabled with the integration of network provenance into our system. We present evaluation results in Section 7.

2.

BACKGROUND

As background, we briefly introduce Binder, a representative
logic-based access control language, and NDlog, the query lan-

guage for declarative networking. Binder and NDlog are query
languages based on Datalog [29]. a Datalog program consists of
a set of declarative rules. Each rule has the form p :- q1, q2,
..., qn., which can be read informally as “q1 and q2 and ...
and qn implies p”. Here, p is the head of the rule, and q1, q2,...,qn
is a list of literals that constitutes the body of the rule. Literals are
either predicates with attributes (which are bound to variables or
constants by the query), or boolean expressions that involve function symbols (including arithmetic) applied to attributes. In Datalog, rule predicates can be defined with other predicates in a cyclic
fashion to express recursion. The order in which the rules are presented in a program is semantically immaterial; likewise, the order
predicates appear in a rule is not semantically meaningful. Commas are interpreted as logical conjunctions (AND). The names of
predicates, function symbols, and constants begin with a lowercase
letter, while variable names begin with an uppercase letter.

2.1

Binder: Access Control Language

Binder is a logic-based language for expressing access control
policies. We select Binder as our representative language since it
has a simple language design, and is most similar to NDlog. Basically, a Binder program is a set of Datalog-style logical rules.
Unlike Datalog, Binder has a notion of context that represents a
component in a distributed environment and a distinguished operator says. For instance, in Binder we can write:
b1 may-access(P,O,read) :- good(P).
b2 may-access(P,O,read) :bob says may-access(P,O,read).

The says operator implements one of the common logical constructs in authentication [18], where we assert p says s if the
principal p supports the statement s. The above rules b1 and
b2 can be read as “any principal P may access any object O in read
mode if P is good or if bob says that P may do so”.
A principal in Binder refers to a component in a distributed environment. Each principal has its own local context where its rules
reside. Binder assumes an untrusted network, where different components can serve different roles running distinct sets of rules. Because of the lack of trust among nodes, a component does not have
control over rule execution and message generation at other nodes.
Instead, Binder allows separate programs to interoperate correctly
and securely via the export and import of rules and derived tuples
across contexts. For example, rule b2 can be a local rule that is
executing in the context of principal alice, which imports derived
may-access tuples from the principal bob into its local context
via bob says may-access(p,o,read) in its rule body.
The says operator abstracts from the details of authentication.
In one specific implementation, communication happens via signed
certificates, where derived tuples and rules signed using the private
key of the exporting context can be imported into another context
and checked using the corresponding public key.

2.2

NDlog: Declarative Networking Language

The high level goal of declarative networks is to build extensible network architectures that achieve a good balance of flexibility,
performance and safety. Declarative networks are specified using
Network Datalog (NDlog), which is a distributed recursive query
language used for querying network graphs. NDlog queries are
executed using a distributed query processor to implement the network protocols, and continuously maintained as distributed views
over existing network and host state. Declarative queries such as
NDlog are a natural and compact way to implement a variety of
routing protocols and overlay networks. For example, traditional

routing protocols can be expressed in a few lines of code [23], and
the Chord DHT in 47 lines of code [22]. When compiled and executed, these declarative networks perform efficiently relative to
imperative implementations. We illustrate NDlog using a simple
example of two rules that computes all pairs of reachable nodes:
r1 reachable(@S,D) :- link(@S,D).
r2 reachable(@S,D) :- link(@S,Z), reachable(@Z,D).

The rules r1 and r2 specify a distributed transitive closure computation, where rule r1 computes all pairs of nodes reachable within
a single hop from all input links, and rule r2 expresses that “if there
is a link from S to Z, and Z can reach D, then S can reach D.” By
modifying this simple example, we can construct more complex
routing protocols, such as the distance vector and path vector routing protocols.
NDlog supports a location specifier in each predicate, expressed
with @ symbol followed by an attribute. This attribute is used to denote the source location of each corresponding tuple. For example,
all reachable and link tuples are stored based on the @S address
field. The output of interest is the set of all reachable(@S,D) tuples, representing reachable pairs of nodes from S to D. The above
NDlog program is executed as distributed stream computations,
where streams of link and reachable tuples are joined at different nodes to compute routing tables. Tuples can also be maintained
as soft-state, where tables are first declared with lifetimes that indicate the duration each tuple is maintained in the system (see [22])).

2.3

Comparing Binder and NDlog

Having introduced Binder and NDlog, we now elaborate on the
differences between these two languages, to set the stage and motivate the unified features of SeNDlog in Section 3.
Trusted vs untrusted networks: One of the important requirements of both Binder and NDlog is the ability to support rules that
express distributed computations, where nodes can communicate
with each other. Hence, NDlog supports the notion of location that
is similar to Binder’s notion of context. On the other hand, NDlog
is designed for a fully trusted environment, where the location relates to data placement. Each NDlog rule takes as input predicates
with different location specifiers, and generate tuples are blindly
accepted by other nodes. On the other hand, Binder assumes an
untrusted network, where rules are executed with their own context, and communication happens via the use of “says”; unlike in
NDlog, reliable authentication is required.
Export of derived tuples: In Binder, there is no integration of the
security policy with the policy for exporting data. To illustrate, we
consider the rule b2 from the above example. The principal alice
that runs these rules may wish only to export may-access(P,O,read)
to the principal P, and not all nodes. It is not possible to express this restriction in Binder. Hence, any principal can import
the may-access(P,O,read) tuple derived by alice. Being able
to restrict the sending of messages to selected recipients is an important requirement in secure network protocols, both from performance and secrecy standpoints. NDlog achieves that with the use
of location specifiers at the rule head.
Bottom-up vs top-down evaluation: Most access control languages
including a practical implementation of Binder and SD3 utilize a
goal-oriented top-down evaluation (backward-chaining from head
to body) strategy. Specific requests are made as goals, which are
then resolved against the security policies. On the other hand, network protocols are long-running processes, and incrementally recompute and repair routes based on changes to the underlying network. Hence, NDlog programs are executed in a bottom-up (or
forward-chaining) [28] evaluation where the bodies of the rules are

evaluated to derive the heads. This has the advantage of permitting
set-oriented optimizations while avoiding infinite recursive loops,
and at the same time, is a better fit for the incremental continuous execution model of network protocols. In addition, there are
well-known database optimizations such as magic-sets [4] where
can achieve the benefits of bottom-up evaluation, while avoid computing redundant facts in a goal-oriented fashion.

3.

SECURE NETWORK DATALOG

Next we present the SeNDlog language based on the unification
of Binder and NDlog. The goals of SeNDlog are as follows. First,
the language should be easy and intuitive to use, but still as expressive as Binder and NDlog to support security policies and network
protocols that have been previously supported by both languages.
Second, the language constructs of SeNDlog should support authenticated communication and also enable the differentiation of
nodes according to their roles. Third, SeNDlog should support both
trusted and untrusted environments. Fourth, to leverage existing execution engines and fit the incremental continuous execution model
of network protocols, SeNDlog must be amenable to efficient execution and optimizations by a distributed query engine using a
bottom-up evaluation strategy.

3.1

Rules within a Context

In the SeNDlog language, we bind a set of rules and the associated tuples to reside at a particular node. We do this at the top level
for each rule (or set of rules), for example by specifying:
At N,
r1 p :- p1,p2,...,pn.
r2 p1 :- p2,p3,...,pn.

In the example above, the rules r1 and r2 are in the context of
N, where N is either a variable or a constant representing the principal where the rules reside. If N is a variable, it will be instantiated
with local information upon rule installation. In a trusted world, N
can simply be the address of a node. For a typical network, IP addresses can be assumed. In order to support layered authentication,
we additionally support dynamic location specifiers [24]: N can reference a logical address denoted by [oID]::nID, where oID is an
optional overlay identifier, and nID is an mandatory overlay node
identifier. In a multi-user environment where multiple users may
reside on the same physical node, N can further include the user
name. We can attach additional conditions c1,c2,...,cn that are
used to determine at runtime whether a node serves a certain role:
At N, c1,c2,...,cn
r1 p :- p1,p2,...,pn.
r2 p1 :- p2,p3,...,pn.

In the above example, a principal N can execute the rules r1 and
r2 only if all the conditions c1,c2,...,cn are satisfied at runtime. This allows the role of a principal to be defined based on
runtime conditions.

3.2

Communicating Contexts

Similar to Binder, the SeNDlog language allow different principals or contexts to communicate via import and export of tuples.
The movement of tuples serves two purposes: (1) maintenance
messages as part of a network protocol’s updates on routing tables,
and (2) distributed derivation of security decisions. Imported tuples from a principal N are automatically quoted using “N says”,
to differentiate them from local tuples. During the evaluation of
SeNDlog rules, we allow derived tuples to be communicated among
contexts via the use of import predicates and export predicates:

Definition 1: An import predicate is of the form “N says p” in a
rule body, where N is the principal that is asserting the predicate p.
Definition 2: An export predicate is of the form ”N says p@X” in
a rule head, where principal N exports the predicate p to the context
of principal X. Here, X can be a constant or a variable. If X is a variable, in order to make bottom-up evaluation efficient, we further
require that the variable X occur in the rule body. As a shorthand,
we can omit “N says” if N is the principal where the rule resides.
The use of export predicates ensures confidentiality and prevents
information leakage, by only exporting tuples to a specified principals. Similar to principals, our location specifiers need not be
IP addresses. They can flexibly refer to logical overlay addresses
whose types are determined at runtime. This feature is necessary
for dynamically layering multiple secure overlays at runtime, e.g.
a distributed query processor over a secure DHT. Detailed description of dynamic overlay composition is outside the scope of this
paper (see [24] for more details).
With the definitions above, a SeNDlog rule is a Datalog rule
where the rule body can include import predicates, and the rule
head can be an export predicate. We provide a concrete example
with the following four SeNDlog rules e1-e4:
At N,
e1 p(X,Y) :- p1(X), p2(Y).
e2 p(X,Y,W) :- Y says p1(X), Z says p2(W), Z!=N.
e3 p(Y,Z)@X :- p1(X), Y says p2(Z).
e4 Z says p(Y)@X :- Z says p(Y), p1(X).

Rule e1 is a traditional Datalog rule. Rule e2 contains two predicates p1 and p2 imported from Y and Z respectively. The output of
e1 and e2 are stored locally as p. Rules e3 and e4 contain an import predicate each, and export their derived heads to X. Note that,
in rule e4, the export principal Z differs from the principal N.
To ensure that p is indeed asserted by Z, we introduce the honesty
constraint in all SeNDlog rules:
Definition 3: A SeNDlog rule in the context of principal N is
honest if the following condition is satisfied: if the rule head is “X
says p”, where X is a constant or a variable, either X is N, or “X
says p” occurs in the body of the rule.
The honesty constraint enables a simple implementation. Specifically, for security, whenever a principal other than N exports N
says p, it should provide a proof that this is the case; the proof
is a signature by N. With the honesty constraint, the principal may
simply forward the signature that corresponds to the occurrence of
N says p in the rule body. Like NDlog, SeNDlog allows derived
tuples to be exported to specific nodes via the export predicates.
This is done as a way of enforcing secrecy and also performance
(avoiding broadcast of tuples).

3.3

Language Extensions

We aim to keep the SeNDlog language as simple as possible.
Nevertheless, in this section we briefly discuss some possible extensions. The implementation of ”says” may depend on the system
and its context. Ideally, SeNDlog should support a heterogeneous
network where nodes have different security levels. In a hostile
world, ”says” may require digital signatures. For example, in rule
e3 from Section 3.2, N should check that p2 indeed came from Y
by checking the signature of the imported tuple against Y’s public key. In a more benign world, ”says” may simply append a
cleartext principal header to a message—and this will of course be
cheaper. Somewhere in between, the use of digital signatures may
be applied only to certain important messages: there is a trade-off
between security and efficiency, and the language does not provide
any leverage in deciding how that trade-off should be made. Note

however that the policy writer could easily provide hints along with
rules, indicating that some “says” are more important than others.
Going further, one can support multiple “says” constructs with different security levels. This requires the export predicate be explicit
about the security level, e.g. “N says0 p@X” exports predicate p
to X with security level 0 (which may simply involve a cleartext
principal header with no signatures), and X can only import p in
its rule body via an authentication scheme at the same or higher
security level.
There are several other security constructs such as secrecy [2],
delegation [20], speaks-for [18], and privilege revocation that we
would like to explore in future. Another language extension includes support for security protocols that utilize distributed votebased agreements. This has been formalized in various trust management languages [20], where a fact in the rule head is derived
only when k-out-of-n principals in a rule body predicate derive a
similar fact concurrently.

4.

PRACTICAL SENDLOG EXAMPLES

In this section, we provide three example specifications using
SeNDlog to demonstrate its language features. Our examples build
upon previous examples, starting from a secure routing protocol,
to a secure DHT overlay, followed by secure p2p query processing
layered over a secure DHT. We present evaluation results of these
examples in Section 7. In addition to these examples, we have also
explored using SeNDlog to implement a secure version of DNS as
presented in SD3 [15], and enforcing access control policies in p2p
file-sharing networks and shared testbeds [27].

4.1

Authenticated Path-Vector Protocol

At Z,
z1 route(Z,X,P) :- neighbor(Z,X), P=f_initPath(Z,X).
z2 route(Z,Y,P) :- X says advertise(Y,P),
acceptRoute(Z,X,Y).
z3 advertise(Y,P1)@X :- neighbor(Z,X), route(Z,Y,P),
carryTraffic(Z,X,Y), P1=f_concat(X,P).

Our first example shows the basic path vector protocol as presented in the declarative routing paper [23], with the additional use
of the “says” operator. At every node Z, this program takes as input neighbor(Z,X) tuples that contain all neighbors X for Z. The
input carryTraffic and acceptRoute tables are used to represent the export and import policies of node Z respectively. Each
carryTraffic(Z,X,Y) tuple represents the fact that node Z is
willing to serve all network traffic on behalf of node X to node Y,
and each acceptRoute(Z,Y,X) tuple represents the fact that node
Z will accept a route from node X to node Y.
At every node Z that runs the above program, the
Z says advertise(Y,P) tuples containing the path to destination node Y is communicated among neighboring nodes. As noted
in Section 3.2, we omit “Z says” for brevity in rule z3. The use
of “says” ensures that all advertise tuples are verified by the
recipient for authenticity. The eventual outcome of executing the
program is the generation of route(Z,X,P) tuples, each of which
stores the path P from source Z to destination X.
Rule z1 takes as input neighbor(Z,X) tuples, and computes
all the single hop route(Z,X,P) containing the path [Z,X] from
node Z to X. Rules z2-z3 are used to compute routes of increasing
hop count. Upon receiving an advertise(Y,P) tuple from X, Z
uses rule z2 to decide whether to accept the route advertisement
based on its local acceptRoute table. If the route is accepted, a
route tuple is derived locally, and this results in the generation
of an advertise tuple which is further exported by node Z via

rule z3 to selected neighbors X based on the policies of the local
carryTraffic table. Each exported advertise tuple has a new
path P1 which is computed by prepending neighbor X to the input
path P using the f concat function1 A more complex version of
this protocol will have additional rules that derive carryTraffic
and acceptRoute, avoid path cycles and also derive shortest paths
with the fewest hop count.
With a basic authenticated routing protocol in place, we can add
additional rules to implement large-scale information systems that
require a secure routing layer. The secure version of the BGP [31]
inter-domain routing protocol is an example of a large-scale information system where autonomous AS gateways exchange route advertisements. Other information systems include p2p file sharing
applications that require authenticated routing among neighbors,
or secure content distribution networks.

4.2

Secure Distributed Hash Tables

In our second example, we use SeNDlog to specify the assignment of node identifiers in secure DHT overlays. We base our example on a declarative version of Chord originally implemented in
47 rules [22]. Our version of the code avoids a security weakness
in a DHT where malicious nodes can occupy a large range of the
key space. We focus on showing SeNDlog versions of the relevant
rules from the original Chord specification.
This example also demonstrates the use of SeNDlog to specify
the different roles for nodes. There are three sets of rules for three
types of nodes: (1) a new node NI joining the chord ring, (2) the
certificate authority CA, and (3) the landmark node LI. Each node
runs its respective set of rules as follows:
At NI,
ni1 requestCert(NI,K)@CA :- startNetwork(NI),
publicKey(NI,K), MyCA(NI,CA).
ni2 nodeID(NI,N) :- CA says nodeIDCert(NI,N,K)
ni3 CA says nodeIDCert(NI,N,K)@LI :CA says nodeIDCert(NI,N,K),
landmark(NI,LI).
At CA,
ca1 nodeIDCert(NI,N,K)@NI :NI says requestCert(NI,K),
S=secret(CA,NI), N=f_generateID(K,S).
At LI,
li1 acceptJoinRequest(NI) :CA says nodeIDCert(NI,N,K).

In rule ni1, a node NI that wishes to join the Chord ring first
exports a requestCert tuple to its CA (as indicated in the entry in its MyCA table) to request nodeID certificates. Upon receiving the request, the CA generates a nodeIDCert(NI,N,K) tuple containing the nodeID certificate, which is then exported back
to node NI. The nodeIDCert(NI,N,K) tuple contains the IP address of node NI, the corresponding public key K, and a generated
identifier N randomly chosen from the keyspace using the function
f generateID(K,S) that takes as input the public key of K and a
previously exchanged secret S known only to the CA and NI.
Upon importing the nodeIDCert tuple from the CA, using rule
ni2, node NI initializes its local node identifier which stored as
a nodeID(NI,N) tuple. It also forwards the nodeIDCert to its
landmark node LI in order to join the chord ring. At the landmark node LI, nodeIDCert is imported and checked for authenticity. If nodeIDCert is accepted, the landmark node derives an
acceptJoinRequest(NI) tuple that can further be used to generate a lookup request to locate the successor node on behalf of node
1
In both NDlog and SeNDlog, function calls are additionally
prepended by f .

NI. The rules as presented [22] can then be used by node NI to

implement the rest of the Chord protocol.
In the above example, CA generates a certified node identifier for
a node NI to join the network. To take this one step further, one
can express the SeNDlog rules that result in authenticated all communication among all Chord nodes. In this case, each message exchanged between nodes are communicated via says, and digitally
signed by each node.

4.3

Secure DHT-based Join Processing

In our third example, we present a distributed database join operation that can be performed securely over a DHT. Joins over
DHTs are widely studied and used in p2p query processors such as
PIER [14] for the purposes of p2p keyword search and performing
network event correlations. In an untrusted environment, authenticated communication is essential for ensuring that malicious nodes
do not inject tuples that will corrupt the final answer. Our example demonstrates that additional query processing capabilities at the
application level can be written elegantly as SeNDlog rules, often
with the use of logical location specifiers to address network state
at the lower levels. Moreover, authentication can be performed at
various layers in the network. The following rules implement a
distributed join operation in the PIER query processor:
At alice,
a1 storeA(X,Y)@NI :- tableA(X,Y), K=f_sha(X),
NI=Chord::K.
At bob,
b1 storeB(X,Y)@NI :- tableB(X,Y), K=f_sha(X),
NI=Chord::K.
At NI,
r1 results(X,Y)@r :- alice says storeA(X,Y),
bob says storeB(Y,Z).

Our example consists of two tables tableA and tableB, owned
by principals alice and bob respectively. Rules a1 and b1 are
executed in the context of alice and bob respectively. For the ease
of exposition, our rules indicate the two principals as alice and
bob constants. In practice, the principle may additionally include
the address of the principals, as described in Section 3.1.
Ownership-based publishing: Rules a1 and b1 result in indexing
all of tableA and tableB in the DHT, based on the hash of the first
attribute. To do that, both alice and bob compute the SHA-1 hash
of the first attribute X to generate a Chord identifier K, denoted as the
logical address Chord::K in the rules. The resulting storeA and
storeB tuples are then sent to the node NI responsible for storing
tuples for the identifier Chord::K. In an untrusted environment,
these published tuples also include the signatures of alice and
bob, which are verified before being stored at NI.
Layered authentication: This example demonstrates the possibility of layered authentication. The execution of rules a1 and b1
would result in a Chord lookup to locate NI, and the communication for the underlying Chord protocol can be authenticated as described in Section 4.2. Layered authentication ensures that alice
and bob can authenticate in an end-to-end fashion at the query processor layer, in addition to any authenticated communication at the
underlying Chord overlay.
Distributed joins: Rule r1 is a query issued by node r to perform
a distributed join of storeA and storeB tuples. This rule is disseminate as a query, and upon reaching all nodes NI, a distributed
DHT-based join [14] is performed as follows. The rules for rehashing these tuples can themselves be automatically rewritten by
a PIER query processor implemented in SeNDlog as follows:
At NI,

r1a alice says rehashA(X,Y)@RI :alice says storeA(X,Y),
K=f_sha(Y), RI=Chord::K.
At RI:
r1b result(X,Y)@r :- alice says rehashA(X,Y),
bob says storeB(Y,Z).
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5.

SECURE QUERY PROCESSING

In this section, we describe query processing techniques for executing SeNDlog programs. Our proposed Authenticated Pipelined
Semi-naı̈ve (APSN) is an adaptation of the Pipelined Semi-naı̈ve
(PSN) [21] proposed for processing distributed recursive queries in
declarative networks.We first provide a brief background on PSN
followed by APSN. We will additional describe opportunities for
future extensions.

5.1

Background on PSN

Unlike traditional semi-naı̈ve evaluation, PSN relaxes the requirement to perform computations in synchronous rounds (or iterations), a prohibitively expensive operation in a distributed setting.
We describe the simplest version of PSN, where tuples are processed tuple-at-a-time in a pipelined fashion, and duplicate evaluations are avoided using local arrival timestamps. We consider the
following recursive Datalog rule p :- d1 , d2 , ..., dn , b1 , b2 , ..., bm .
In the rule body, there are n derived predicates (p1 , ..., pn ), and
m base predicates (b1 , ..., bm ). Derived predicates refer to intensional relations that are derived during rule execution, and may be
mutually recursive with p. Base predicates refer to extensional
(stored) relations whose values are not changed during rule execution. In PSN, a delta rule is generated for each derived predicate,
where the kth delta rule is of the form: 4p :- d1 , .., dk−1 , 4dk ,
dk+1 , .., dn , b1 , b2 , ..., bm .
4dk denotes a tuple tk ∈ dk that is used as input to the rule
for computing new d tuples. In PSN, each node maintains a FIFO
queue (ordered by arrival timestamp) of new input tuple. Each new
tuple is dequeued and is used as input to its respective a delta rule.
The execution of a delta rule may generate new tuples which are
either inserted into the local queue or sent to a remote node for
further execution.

5.2

Authenticated PSN

In APSN, import and export predicates (Section 3.2) denoted by
the “says” keyword require additional operators for authentication. Consider the following SeNDlog rule: p says a :- d1 , ..., dn ,
b1 , ..., bn , p1 says a1 , p2 says a2 ..., po says ao . There are o additional import predicates of the form “pk says ak ” in the rule body,
and an export predicate in the rule head. For each kth import predicate, a authenticated delta rule is generated as follows:
4p says a :- d1 , ..., dn , b1 , ..., bm ,
.
p1 says a1 , ..., pk says 4ak , ..., po says ao .
In the rest of the section, we will show how delta rules are compiled into execution plans.

5.2.1

Basic Dataflow Generation

Figure 1 shows an exampled dataflow that is automatically generated from the SeNDlog rules by our query processor. The dataflow
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Figure 1: Dataflow execution plan for a single node.

execution model is based on that of the P2 declarative networking system [22]. In P2, queries are compiled and executed as distributed dataflows and share a similar execution model with the
Click modular router [17]. At the edges of the dataflow, there are
several network processing operators (denoted by Network-In and
Network-Out) used to process incoming and outgoing messages.
Flow control operators such as Mux, Queue, TimedPullPush, and
Demux supports buffering, multiplexing, demultiplexing, and periodic flow of tuples within the dataflow.
At the core of the dataflow are rule strands shown within the
gray box, which are directly compiled from the PSN and APSN
delta rules into a series of relational operators such as joins, aggregations, selections, and projections. Messages flowing among
dataflows executed at different nodes, resulting in updates to local
tables, or query results that are returned to the hosts that issued the
queries. The local tables store the state of intermediate and computed query results, which include the network state of various network protocols. Each P2 tuple has an associated lifetime declared
at creation time of each table2 .Each incoming tuple is then stored
locally for its lifetime.
In traditional PSN, each delta rule will be compiled into two rule
strands one for incremental insertion and one for deletion respectively. Given an input tuple, the output of executing a strand would
either be local state modifications (insertions/deletions to local tables), or generation of new messages which are then transmitted
via the Network Out operators.
APSN rule strands (shown as the first two gray boxes in Figure 1)
differ from PSN in the use of authenticated communication. This
requires two additional operators shown in bold in the dataflow:
• The SigGenerator operator is used to sign outgoing tuples
based on the private key of the local principal. All outgoing tuples t that require authentication are communicated as
p,s,t triplets, where p corresponds to the source principle,
s is the signature generated by encrypting a message digest
(essentially a cryptographic hash of t) with p’s private key.
• At the receiving node, if authentication is required, an additional SigChecker operator checks all incoming tuples
p,s,t, by decrypting s with the public key of p, and verifying that the decrypted contents matches the cryptographic
hash of t.
2
A zero lifetime tuple is treated as an event stream that will trigger
rules and be discarded. An infinite lifetime tuple is stored locally
until explicitly deleted. In between, tuples may be maintained as
soft-state with a fixed lifetime, similar to time-based sliding windows in stream processing [10].

The SigGenerator and SigChecker uses a public-key cryptography scheme that can be computationally expensive. The
SigChecker operator requires knowledge of the public key of the
principle whom the dataflow is importing tuples from. Note that
Key management is an orthogonal problem to our work. In the
simplest model, each node have full apriori knowledge of all the
public keys of all other communicating peers. This is evidently not
practical. A more feasible approach that we have adopted (e.g.in
Section 4.2) involves the runtime system to fetch public keys on
demand (upon receiving a tuple that requires authentication) from a
known CA, and cache the public key for future use. Other lightweight
key management schemes are possible, and integrating them into
our execution plans is an avenue for future work.

5.2.2

Example APSN Strand

Figure 2 provides a closer look at individual operators that comprise each rule strand shown in Figure 1. Our example is based on
rule z2 used in the authenticated path vector protocol presented in
Section 4.1. The APSN delta rules are as follows:
z2a 4route(Z, Y, P ) :- X says 4advertise(Y, P ),
.
acceptRoute(Z, X, Y ).
z2b 4route(Z, Y, P ):- X says advertise(Y, P ),
.
4acceptRoute(Z, X, Y ).
The first rule strand z2a (shown as strand z2a@Z in Figure 2)
takes as input advertise(Y,P) tuples from the network. After each advertise tuple is verified by the SigChecker operator based on the public key of X retrievable from the local store,
the advertise tuple is inserted via the Insert operator, and if
this is a tuple not seen previously,joined with matching tuples from
the local acceptRoute table to generate new route tuples which
are further inserted into the local route table. Rule 2b (shown as
strand z2b@Z) is triggered by changes to the local acceptRoute
table, and hence requires no authentication. A similar join is performed with the local advertise table to generate new route tuples. Since both delta rules insert into the local route table rather
than export the output tuples to remote principals, they need not be
signed. On the other hand, the rule strand for rule z3 from Section 4.1 would require a SigGenerator operator to generate the
signature using the private key of Z before being sent.
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Figure 2: Generated Rule Strands for rule z2.

5.3

6.

DIAGNOSTICS AND FORENSICS WITH
NETWORK PROVENANCE

The dataflow framework used in our platform captures information flow naturally as distributed streams computations. Hence, it
is natural to utilize the database notion of data provenance to “explain” the existence of any network state. We summarize a variety
of diagnostics and analysis opportunities [34] that arise from the
use of our platform. The main goal of this section is to illustrate
the potential for doing analysis and auditing across levels given a
unifying declarative framework for network routing, information
systems, and security policies.

Network In

SigChecker

in Figure 1: OverlayRecvUnwrap, OverlaySendWrap, and
LocSpecDemux. The operators OverlayRecvUnwrap and
OverlaySendWrap are used for de-encapsulation and encapsulation of tuples from an underlying network specified in SeNDlog.
At the top of Figure 1, the Mux multiplexes incoming tuples received locally or from the network. These tuples are processed
by the OverlayRecvUnwrap operator that will extract the overlay
payload for all tuples of the form overlay.recv(Packet), where
Packet is the payload with type tuple. Since the payload may be
encapsulated by multiple headers (for layered overlays), this operator needs to “unwrap” until the payload is retrieved. The Packet
payload is then used as input to the dataflow via the ReceiveDemux
operator, and used as input to various rule strands for execution.
Executing the rule strands results in the generation of output tuples
that are sent to a LocSpecDemux operator. This operator checks
the runtime type of the location specifier, and then demultiplexes
accordingly. Tuples designated for the local node are directed back
to the same dataflow, and IP-based tuples are sent over the network.
To support layering, outgoing tuples designated for a local overlay
node are de-encapsulated, and reinserted back to the same dataflow.
To support different levels of ”says”, an optional security level
attribute can be included to the output of the SigGenerator operator. The SigChecker operator can then apply the appropriate
level of authentication. For example, other computationally less
expensive schemes such as the use of cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) are also possible, if nodes apriori agree
upon a shared secret key. Our declarative framework and runtime
system does not preclude the use of these alternative schemes: they
will correspond to different levels of “says” and the query planner will automatically generate the appropriate SigGenerator and
Checker operators to implement the authentication mechanism. In
addition, while we focus our discussion to supporting the “says”
operator described in Section 3. Other security mechanisms (e.g.
public-key encryption for confidentiality) can be similarly supported
by additional operators that encrypt/decrypt incoming and outgoing
tuples.

Layering Support and Security Extensions

SeNDlog support layered authentication, as shown by the secure
DHT-based joins in Section 4.3, where secure communication can
happen at different layers (e.g. layering a secure p2p query processor on top of a secure Chord DHT). This requires dataflow support
for layering [24] and dynamic location specifiers.
The dataflow includes three additional operators shown in bold

6.1

Use Cases

We focus on use cases ranging from real-time diagnostics, forensics, and trust management, and relate them to different types of
network provenance enabled by our platform.
Real-time Diagnostics: Provenance is useful for real-time diagnostics and debugging of distributed systems, in order to detect
run-time anomalies resulted from divergent protocols and network
intrusion. For example, a continuous query specified in SeNDlog
can be used to compute the number of changes to a routing table
entry over past T seconds, and generate an alarm event when the
number of changes exceed a threshold as an indication of possible
divergence. Upon receiving the alarm, the system may generate a
distributed recursive query over the network provenance to detect-

ing the source of malicious activities.
Forensics: In addition to real-time data, historical data is often required to correlate traffic patterns of attackers. A common area of
research has been in providing IP “traceback”[30] of traffic, either
by the receiver or by an involved third party, to determine where
packets are originated from without trusting the unauthenticated IP
headers. One can store annotations either in the packet (i.e. piggyback each tuple with its complete “path” or “provenance”), or
maintain state at each router, to allow for subsequent traceback via
a distributed query during forensic analysis. To reduce the storage
and communication overhead, summarization (via bloom filters)
and sampling techniques respectively to compress the provenance.
Trust Management: In our final use case, network provenance is
useful for enforcing distributed trust management [7] policies in
networked information systems. Using an example from Internet
routing, the path-vector protocol used in BGP carries the entire path
during route advertisement, in order to allow for ASes to enforce
their respective policies. More generally, provenance in our system
enables any networked information node to trace the origins of its
data via a “chain of custody”, and hence enforce trust policies to
accept or reject incoming updates based on the source origins.

6.2

Figure 3: NDlog provenance for reachable(@a,c).

Network Provenance

Given the above use cases, we present a partial list of possible
types of network provenance [34] that can be incorporated into
our system. We make use of an example network which consists
of three nodes a, b, c and three unidirectional links link(a,b),
link(a,c), link(b,c). Figure 3 shows the derivation tree for
reachable(@a,c) that results from executing the NDlog program
in Section 2.2. This derivation tree essentially represents the provenance of the tuple, where the initial input base tuples are at the
leaves of the tree. The ovals in the diagram represent the rules
(r1, r2, or union to combine their results) that are used for the
derivation of reachable(@a,c). In order to incorporate provenance into SeNDlog executions, we annotate each derivation with
its location (denoted by the location specifier.
Local vs Distributed Provenance The derivation tree shown in
Figure 3 can be stored either locally or in a distributed fashion.
In local provenance, the tree is stored at node a, which is the final storage location of reachable(@a,b). In order to have a
locally complete provenance, each tuple that is derived needs to
piggy-back its entire provenance when shipped from one node to
another. On the other hand, one can utilize distributed provenance,
which only stores pointers to the previous node to reconstruct its
provenance on demand. Hence, node a only needs to maintain the
fact that it is derived from its local link(@a,b) and node b’s
reachable(@b,c). The analogy here is IP traceback, where one
can either store the entire traversed path within each packet (similar
to local provenance), or only maintain enough state at each router
to traceback the route on demand (distributed provenance). There
are evidently tradeoffs between local and distributed provenance.
In local provenance, computation is more expensive for each tuple,
but queries can be computed locally. Also, trust policies can be enforced without having to contact other nodes. On the other hand,
distributed provenance requires no extra communication overhead,
but incurs expensive cost of querying the provenance.
Online vs Offline Provenance. We can further classify provenance
as either online or offline. Online provenance is maintained for
network state that is currently valid (i.e. not expired), and offline
provenance is kept even when the derivations have expired. The
purpose of online provenance is to detect network anomalies at runtime. For example, when a node is detected to be suspicious, one
can query the online provenance to delete all routing entries associ-

Figure 4: SeNDlog provenance for reachable(a,c) in a’s context.

ated with the malicious node. However, online provenance by itself
has limited usage given that most networked data are maintained as
soft-state with limited lifetimes. In this case, we can additionally
maintain offline provenance for data that has long expired. Offline
provenance is useful also for real-time diagnostics, and can additionally be used to support forensics and enforce accountability.
Authenticated Provenance: In an untrusted network, authentication may be required to ensure the validity of provenance computed by other nodes (e.g. to prevent spoofing of messages from
malicious attackers). Figure 4 shows an alternative derivation tree
based on a SeNDlog version of the same reachable query. We note
the following differences. First, since all rule bodies are localized
within the context of a security principal, we can omit the location
specifiers for each tuple. However, we annotate each operator (denoted by the oval) with the location (or context) where the rule is
executed. Second, each node in the tree is asserted by a principal
using “says”. In an untrusted environment, this means that individual nodes in the provenance tree need to validate the authenticity
of the computed provenance using digital signatures. As notation,
each tuple has an additional field denoted by <...> that stores the
principals used for deriving the tuple are encoded as algebraic expressions [12]. + represents union, and * represents a join. Based
on this algebraic expression, each principal can determine the principals involved in deriving the fact, and hence determine whether
to accept this fact based on existing trust relationships.
To illustrate different types of network provenance, we provide
an example based on network packet traceback. The following
SeNDlog rule forwards packets in the network based on the local
routing tables:
At Router,
f1 packet(Pid,Dest,Data)@NextHop :forwarding(Dest,NextHop), Router != Dest,
P says packet(Pid,Dest,Data).

The forwarding table is stored at every router, and is computed by adding additional rules to the path vector protocol in Sec-

tion 4.1 to compute the nextHop router along the best path to any
given destination (Dest). Given an incoming packet unique by
its Pid to Dest with payload Data, rule f1 retrieves from the
forwarding table the nextHop router along the best path to Dest.
This payload is recursively routed by rule f1 to the destination.
In order to traceback potential malicious traffic, one can annotate
each outgoing packet tuple with its provenance. This can be in
the form of local provenance, in which case the entire path (stored
as the derivation of packet) is forwarded with each packet tuple. In distributed provenance, state is maintained at every router
to traceback the reverse path of each packet uniquely identified by
its pid back to the source. If routers are untrusted, authentication can be achieved by adding a signature generated from each
packet including any additional provenance information, hence
resulting in the use of authenticated provenance. Annotating every packet with its provenance can be expensive, both in terms of
computation and bandwidth consumption. In the original IP traceback proposal, sampling is performed, where 1/20,000th packets
are annotated with its provenance. Exploring such automatic optimizations in provenance computation is an interesting avenue of
future work.

7.

EVALUATION

In this section, we present the evaluation of our platform on a
local cluster and on PlanetLab. The goals of our evaluation are as
follows. First, we validate that SeNDlog specifications achieve the
expected functionality of a variety of secure networked information systems. Second, we experimentally quantify the performance
overheads of using authenticated communication, both within a local cluster and on a wide-area testbed. Third, we perform a preliminary proof-of-concept evaluation of network provenance support using our platform via a SeNDlog-based packet tracing service
within a local cluster. Our evaluation is based on the P2 declarative networking system [22], with enhancements to execute SeNDlog rules as described in Section 5. To generate signatures used
in APSN, we utilize the OpenSSL v0.9.8b cryptographic libraries
that generate 640-bit signatures given input data. We further added
runtime support to the P2 system to compute online, local and authenticated provenance (Section 6) during rule execution.

7.1

Experimental Setup

Evaluation platform: Our first set of experiments are conducted
by executing our within a local cluster with sixteen quad-core machines with Intel Xeon 2.33GHz CPUs and 4GB RAM running Fedora Core 6 with kernel version 2.6.20, which are interconnected
by high-speed Gigabit Ethernet. The LAN environment allows us
to isolate and examine CPU overhead of executing our platform
within a controlled environment with sufficient bandwidth. Our
second set of experiments are conducted on the PlanetLab [27]
testbed, where 80 geographically distributed nodes in Asia, Europe, and North America are selected to execute our system. The
PlanetLab testbed allows us to examine the real-world effects, such
as bandwidth constraints and propagation delays imposed by geographic distances and queueing delays.
Query workload: Our query workload consists of three SeNDlog example queries presented in Section 4. The Best-Path distributed query takes as input rules z1-z3 from Section 4.1 to generate route tuples, with an additional cost attribute that is the
sum of all links along a path. Two additional local rules are used to
compute the minimum path cost given the local route table, and
select for each source/destination pair, the path with minimum cost.
The Chord query is a declarative version of the Chord DHT [22] in
SeNDlog that supports authenticated communication as described

in Section 4.2, and continuously maintains the Chord routing tables
as new nodes enters and leaves the Chord network. The PIER query
consists of the rules in Section 4.3 that implements a declarative
version of the PIER [14] distributed query processor that supports
distributed indexing and joins of relational tables over the DHT.
Performance metrics: Given the above query workload, our performance metrics are as follows:
• Query completion time: Time taken for a query to finish
execution. As our example queries are recursive, this means
the time elapsed before the system reaches a distributed fixpoint, where all nodes finish their computations on queries.
• Average Bandwidth: The per-node average bandwidth utilization for executing a distributed SeNDlog protocol. This
metric is used for the Chord query which is continuously executing and maintaining its routing tables.
• Aggregate Communication Overhead: The total amount
of traffic generated when executing a single distributed query.
The Best-Path and PIER queries fall into this category.
To get an accurate measure of actual bandwidth utilization, we
make use of the tcpdump system tool that allow us to intercept and
measure all network packets transmitted from one P2 node to another. To explore extremes in performance due to the use of authenticated query processing, we explore two extremes in all our experiments: Auth-None communicates all tuples without authentication,
while Auth represents the other extreme where all communication
that occurs during query evaluation requires a RSA signature to be
generated from the entire tuple and verified by the recipient node.

7.2

LAN Experiments

In this section, we present the results of executing the Best-Path,
Chord and PIER queries on our local cluster, based on the performance metrics described above.

7.2.1

Best-Path Query

Our first experiment consists of executing the Best-Path distributed
recursive query to a fixpoint on all 16 cluster nodes. We vary the
network size from 16 to 128, where at its largest, each cluster machine runs 8 P2 virtual nodes. As input to the Best-Path query, we
initialized a neighbor table where each node has an outdegree of
3. To ensure a connected network, we first connect all nodes in
a a ring, and then randomly add the remaining neighbor links to
achieve the network outdegree.
Figures 5 and 6 show the aggregate communication overhead and
query completion latency for the Best-Path query averaged over
8 experimental runs. We make the following observations. For
the largest network size of 128, Auth incurs 30% additional aggregate communication and an additional 7 seconds is required for
the query to complete execution as compared to Auth-None. Since
our experiments are carried out in a LAN where machines are connected by high-speed Gigabit Ethernet, the additional time required
for query completion can be attributed to the computational overhead of generating the signatures for each message tuple.

7.2.2

Chord DHT

Next, we study the performance characteristics of a SeNDlog implementation of the Chord protocol. The main difference compared
to the previous Best-Path query is the continuous execution flavor
as opposed to a single query execution, where routing tables are incrementally maintained as nodes either and leave the network. Our
experimented Chord network size consist of 128 nodes, and after
all nodes have joined the Chord overlay at 1600s, random Chord

1.2
0.8
0.4

Auth‐None
Auth

0
0

16

32

48

64

80

96

112

128

Number of Nodes
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lookup queries are issued simultaneously from 8 different nodes at
three seconds interval for the next 400 seconds.
Figure 7 shows the per-node bandwidth utilization over time, obtained by averaging tcpdump statistics gathered across all nodes at
any point in time. After all nodes have joined the Chord network
(at time 800s), the per-node bandwidth consumption stabilizes at
0.2KBps and 0.3KBps respectively for Auth-None and Auth. At
1600s, the bandwidth consumption increased due to the additional
Chord lookups that we generated to measure lookup latencies. We
make the following additional observations. First, Auth incurs 47%
more bandwidth compared to Auth-None, which is larger as expected compared to Best-Path, given that Chord message tend to
small (180 bytes on average). Despite incurring higher relative
bandwidth usage, in a LAN environment with sufficient bandwidth,
most of the additional performance penalty can still be attributable
to CPU overhead of signature generation. Given that Chord messages are small, the actual processing penalty due to the signature
generation is negligible, as reflected in Figure 8 where the latency
CDF of Auth-None and Auth are almost equivalent.

7.2.3

64

Number of Nodes

DHT-based Join Query

Building upon our Chord experiment, we experiment with a SeNDlog implementation of a DHT-based PIER distributed join operation operation. This workload involves the continuous execution
of a 128-node Chord network. At each node, we also execute a
PIER query processing node that uses the Chord node for routing.
Running PIER and Chord concurrently allows us to validate the
ability of our platform to layer the PIER overlay over Chord, and
experiment with layered authentication across two layers (PIER
and Chord), as described in Section 5.
Once Chord has stabilized, we issued a bandwidth intensive PIER
query which involves a distributed join over multiple DHT nodes.
The actual SeNDlog query is shown in Section 4.3. First, tables
tableA and tableB, each with N tuples varied from 100 to 800,
are indexed over the Chord DHT based on the hash of their first
attribute value using rules a1 and b1 respectively. Once these two
tables have been published and indexed over the DHT, a distributed
join operation is carried out. This join incurs communication overhead due to the rehashing of tableA and tableB tuples based on
their join key, and the results of the join are sent back to the node
initiating the query. To emulate large sizes of tuples and hence explore the performance limits of authentication using our system, we
additionally padded each tuple with an additional 640 bytes.
Figure 9 shows the aggregate communication overhead incurred
by the distributed join operation as the input table sizes increases
from 100 to 800. We make the following observations. First, the
increase is quadratic as expected, given that the join of two tables
result in a quadratic increase of intermediate and final results (our
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join selectivity is set to 1/16). Second, Auth incurs only an additional 8% additional communication overhead comparing with
Non-Auth, much lower compared to the earlier Best-Path query and
Chord, due to larger sizes of tuples being shipped. To understand
the performance impact of authentication on the query processing
throughput of PIER, Figure 10 shows the progress of query execution (measured by percentage of total final results received) over
time. For table sizes of 500 and 800, we observe that Auth increases
the query completion time by only 1 and 6 seconds respectively.

7.3

PlanetLab Experiments

To examine the effects of bandwidth constraints and propagation
delays over the wide-area, we deploy our SeNDlog implementations of Chord and PIER on PlanetLab. Apart from using PlanetLab, our experimental setup was kept identical to that in our local
cluster. As input to the PIER query, we utilize a distributed join of
two tables with 100 tuples each.
Figure 11 shows the average bandwidth utilization for executing
PIER distributed join query over Chord on PlanetLab. Compared
to a similar LAN experiment in Figure 7, the bandwidth utilization
of 0.2KBps and 0.3KBps for Auth-None and Auth are identical, validating that Chord is executing correctly on PlanetLab in terms of
protocol messages. The PIER query is issued at time 2300s, after
the Chord overlay has stabilized and the two tables tableA and
tableB published and indexed by Chord.
Figures 12 and 13 shows the absolute performance in terms of
Chord lookup latency and PIER query completion time on PlanetLab. In terms of absolute lookup latency, Chord lookups on PlanetLab are an order of magnitude slower compared to a LAN environment. We attribute the increase to real-world effects, where
competing slices on PlanetLab contend for limited bandwidth and
CPU resources. In addition, the performance penalty of authenticated communication is more apparent due to similar constraints.
For example, the median Chord lookup latency increases by 1.5
seconds for Auth compared to Auth-None. We observe a similar effect for the PIER query on PlanetLab in Figure 13: while
the time to receive 50% of result tuples are roughly equivalent for
Auth and Auth-None, the eventual completion time for Auth is 40s
larger. Overall, we observe that in a shared networked environment
with limits on bandwidth and computational resources, authenticated query processing incurs observable performance penalty for
bandwidth intensive distributed joins.

7.4

Network Provenance Experiment

In our final experiment, we perform a preliminary evaluation of
a SeNDlog-based packet tracing service described in Section 6.2.
This experiment validates and evaluates our runtime system support
for computing and communicating local and authenticated prove-
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The experiment consists of 128 P2 nodes executing on our 16node cluster, and the Best-Path query is executed to compute the
forwarding tables used to determine the next hop along the shortest path from a given source to the destination. After this query
has converged, we issue a SeNDlog continuous query on all nodes
that result in 800-byte packets to be injected and forwarded from
random sources to destinations at a rate of 160 packets/second. We
execute SeNDlog packet forwarding with three settings: Auth-None
Prov-None communicates all packets without authentication and
provenance; Auth-None Prov annotates local provenance to every
packets; and Auth Prov additionally signs each packet storing its
provenance for authentication purposes.
Figure 14 shows the bandwidth overhead incurred in delivering
packets. We observe a 12% increase in bandwidth utilization by
Auth-None Prov compared to Auth-None Prov-None. Auth Prov

incurs an additional 10% overhead over Auth-None Prov. Given
that the diameter of the network is small, the provenance consisting
of all intermediate routers along the path from source to destination
is relatively small comparing with the size of packet. Hence, the
additional bandwidth utilization due to provenance is relatively low.
Figure 15 presents the CDF of packets delivery latency (the time
elapsed between sending and receiving a packet). Compared with
Auth-None Prov-None, Auth-None Prov incurs 10% increase in median latency due to the additional cost of computing and shipping
the provenance information with each packet. On the other hand,
Auth Prov incurs high overhead, resulting in 60% increase in median latency. Wince we are running our experiments in a local cluster, the absolute increase in median latency is negligible (less than
0.05 seconds). As follow up, we plan to better understand the performance implications of network provenance support in realistic
wide-area networks, where optimizations such as sampling will be
vital for efficient provenance processing.

7.5

Summary of Results

Revisiting the goals of our evaluation articulated earlier in this
section, we validate that SeNDlog specifications for routing, Chord
DHT, and PIER distributed join result in correct implementations.
Our network provenance experiment on packet tracing with local
and authenticated provenance also result in expected behavior. Within
a local cluster, we note that the performance penalty of using authenticated query processing depends largely on the type of query
being executed. For a continuous executing query that implements
Chord with small message transfers, the overhead in terms of latency is negligible. For a bandwidth intensive query such as computing best paths or executing a distributed DHT-based join, the
performance penalties due to authentication are more apparent, especially on PlanetLab where bandwidth and computation resources
may be limited. These differences may be mitigated with alternative authentication schemes that achieve different performance/security

tradeoffs. Integrating these tradeoffs in an application-tunable fashion into a query optimizer is an interesting area for future work.

8.

RELATED WORK

This paper extends our initial SeNDlog proposal [3] on secure
networking language to a unified platform to build secure information systems at various layers, including the use of dynamic location specifiers that enables layered authentication. In addition, we
have a full-fledged implementation, and experimentations in a LAN
cluster and on PlanetLab.
Our work is related to a large literature on access control in distributed systems (e.g.[15], [20] and [26]). In addition, through our
use of declarative networking techniques, our work is related to a
large literature of network specification languages (e.g.d3log [16],
metarouting [13]). Our system extends and unifies these bodies
of work to enable an extensible platform for secure networked information systems that integrates declarative routing, overlays, and
security policies.
Access control in database systems is a well-explored topic. To
our best knowledge, the usage has been limited to traditional database
management systems. In recent months, we have observed new
application scenarios where security and access control policies
are integrated with distributed stream processing (e.g. [5]), as innetwork stream processing become pervasively deployed on new
and potentially untrusted networked environments (e.g. RFID, sensors, wireless mobile devices). While our paper focuses on secure declarative networking and applications supported within this
framework, at its core, a declarative networking engine is essentially a distributed stream processor that incrementally maintains
recursive stream views in a distributed setting. As future work,
we would like to further explore applying our framework to other
stream processing environments.

9.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we present a unified declarative platform for specifying, implementing, analyzing and auditing large-scale secure information systems. Our proposed SeNDlog language unifies logicbased access control languages with query languages for declarative networking. We extend existing distributed recursive query
processing techniques to execute SeNDlog programs that incorporate the notion of authenticated communication among untrusted
nodes. We conduct a detailed performance evaluation of various
systems developed using our platform within a LAN environment
as well as PlanetLab. We further perform an evaluation of network
provenance via a SeNDlog-based packet tracing service within a
local cluster.
Beyond language extensions to support additional security constructs described in Section 3.3, we believe that there are exciting
cross-layer optimizations and analysis opportunities that can arise
with a unified declarative framework, and we have barely scratch
the surface with this paper. While preliminary, our initial exploration of network provenance lays the groundwork for future exploration in developing bandwidth efficient techniques for querying and maintaining network provenance, and grounding its practical usage for analyzing and securing networks. We would also
like to further explore other practical aspects of our system, including query optimizations that exploit security/performance tradeoffs, scalable key management, extensible security type system,
and also validation of our platform with a greater variety of networked information systems. To this end, we are working towards
a publicly available deployment service on PlanetLab usable by the
community to experiment with new secure networked systems.

10.
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